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Induction is a form of reasoning from the particular example to the general
rule. However, establishing the truth of a general proposition is problematic,
because it is always possible that a conflicting observation to occur. This prob-
lem is known as the induction problem. The sunrise problem is a quintessen-
tial example of the induction problem, which was first introduced by Laplace
(1814). However, in Laplaces solution, a zero probability was assigned to the
proposition that the sun will rise forever, regardless of the number of obser-
vations made. Therefore, it has often been stated that complete confidence
regarding a general proposition can never be attained via induction. In this
study, we attempted to overcome this skepticism by using a recently developed
theoretically consistent procedure. The findings demonstrate that through in-
duction, one can rationally gain complete confidence in propositions based on
scientific theory.
1
Introduction
In the era of artificial intelligence, learning from experience (induction from data) becomes cru-
cial to drawing valid inferences. Induction is a form of reasoning from particular examples to
the general rule, in which one infers a proposition based on data. Originally, the goal of science
was to prove propositions (scientific theory) such as ”all ravens are black”, or to infer them
from observational data. However, the difficulty of deriving such inductive logics has been rec-
ognized as the problem of induction since the Greek and Roman periods. Pyrrhonian skeptic
Sextus Empiricus questioned the validity of inductive reasoning, ”positing that a universal rule
could not be established from an incomplete set of particular instances. Specifically, to establish
a universal rule from particular instances by means of induction, either all or some of the par-
ticulars can be reviewed. If only some of the instances are reviewed, the induction may not be
definitive as some of the instances omitted in the induction may contravene the universal fact;
however, reviewing all the instances may be nearly impossible as the instances are infinite and
indefinite (Heinemann, 1933, p. 283)”. Hume (1748) argued that inductive reasoning cannot
be justified rationally because it presupposes that the future will resemble the past. Kant (1781)
proposed a resolution to the induction problem, which involved considering the propositions as
valid, absolutely a priori. Popper (1959) suggested realizing the falsification of propositions
instead of proving them or trying to view them as valid. Broad (1923) stated that ”induction is
the glory of science but the scandal of philosophy”. However, induction may also be viewed as
a scandal of science if there is no way to confirm scientific theories with complete confidence
via induction. Therefore, in this study, we attempt to demonstrate that if a scientific theory on
how the future data are generated is available, an inductive reasoning can be justified rationally
based on the scientific theory, whose role is an axiom in mathematics.
The question addressed in this work is whether via scientific induction, a scientist (or ar-
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tificial intelligence) can obtain complete confidence regarding a general proposition. We use
probability as the main tool, and for the purpose of this work, we limit ourselves to two con-
cepts of probability. The first concept is Kolmogorov’s (1933) formal mathematical probability
of random events such as coin tossing, which relates to the long-run rate of observable events
(Von Mises, 1928); this aspect involves the P-value and coverage probabilities of the confidence
intervals. The second concept concerns the logical probability of a proposition, developed for
the scientific induction being true. Bayes (1763) introduced a logical probability; however, he
might not have embraced the broad application scope now known as Bayesianism, which was
in fact pioneered and popularized by Laplace (1824) as an inverse probability. Bayesianism
been applied to all types of propositions in scientific and other fields (Paulos, 2011). Savage
(1954) provided an axiomatic basis for the Bayesian probability as a subjective probability. It
is of interest to derive an objective logical probability. Fisher (1930) developed an alternative
logical probability, namely, fiducial probability, which is based on the P-value. Neyman (1937)
introduced the idea of confidence, represented by the coverage probabilities of confidence in-
tervals. The confidence allows for a frequentist interpretation of the long-run rate of coverage
if the confidence intervals are repeatedly produced over different observations. Schweder and
Hjort (2016) viewed the confidence as the Neymanian interpretation of Fisher’s logical proba-
bility. Recently, there has been a surge of renewed interest in the confidence as an estimate of
the logical probability (Xie and Singh, 2013).
An inductive logic is based on the idea that the probability represents a logical relation
between the proposition and the observations. Accordingly, a theory of induction should explain
how one can ascertain that certain observations establish a degree of belief strong enough to
confirm a given proposition. Let G be a general proposition, such as ”all ravens are black” or
”the sun rises forever”, and E be a particular proposition or an observation (evidence) such as
”the raven in front of me is black” or ”the sun rises tomorrow”. Then, we can use the logical
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probability to represent a deductive logic:
P (E|G) = 1 and P (not E|G) = 0.
The logical probability can be quantified as a number between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates impos-
sibility (the proposition is false) and 1 indicates certainty (complete confidence; the proposition
is true). Thus, deductive reasoning can help attain complete confidence, provided that the basic
premises such as the axioms are true. The use of the logical probability for scientific reasoning
was proposed by Cox (1946).
The logical probability allows us to represent the inductive logic as follows:
P (G|not E) = P (not E|G)P (G)/P (not E) = 0, (1)
P (G|E) = P (E|G)P (G)/P (E) = P (G)/P (E) ≥ P (G), (2)
provided that the denominators are not zeros. From (1), we see that one observation of a non-
black raven can certainly falsify the general proposition. Popper (1959) saw this falsifiability
of a proposition as a criterion for scientific theory; if a theory is falsifiable, it is scientific,
and if not, then this theory is unscientific. From (2), we see that a particular observation can
corroborate the general proposition.
Laplace (1814) elaborated on the Bayesian approach to compute the logical probability.
However, Broad (1918) indicated that Laplace’s solution involved the assignment of a zero
probability to the general proposition, regardless of the number of observations made. To this
end, in this study, the confidence resolution of the induction problem was realized by demon-
strating that complete confidence on a general proposition can be achieved via induction based
on a finite number of observations. We also demonstrate that the attained complete confidence
is theoretically consistent.
4
Laplace solution to the sunrise problem
The Bernoulli model was developed for random binary events such as coin tossing. Suppose that
a coin was tossed, but the outcome is unknown. The logical probability for a general proposition
would be like the probability of a coin toss, whose outcome is unknown as the truthfulness of
general proposition is unknown. Laplace (1814) demonstrated how to compute such an actual
logical probability, based on the data. He used the Bernoulli model as an instant of a scientific
theory for the sunrise problem. Let θ be the long-run frequency of sunrises, i.e., the sun rises
on 100×θ% of days. Under the Bernoulli model, the general proposition G that the sun rises
forever is equivalent to the hypothesis θ = 1. The general proposition for which θ = 1 is then a
Popper scientific theory because it can be falsified if a conflicting observation, i.e., one day of
no sunrise, occurs. With a finite sample based on observations until now, could this Bernoulli
model allow for complete confidence on θ = 1?
Prior to the knowledge of any sunrise, suppose that one is completely ignorant of the value
of θ. Laplace (1814) represented this prior ignorance by means of a uniform prior pi0(θ) = 1 on
θ ∈ [0, 1]. This uniform prior was first proposed by Bayes (1763). Given the value of θ and no
other information relevant to the question of whether the sun will rise tomorrow, the probability
of the particular proposition E that the sun will rise tomorrow is θ. However, we do not know
the true value of θ. Thus, let Tn be the number of sunrises in n days. We are provided with
the observed data that the sun has risen every day on record (Tn = n). Laplace, based on a
young-earth creationist reading of the Bible, inferred the number of days by considering that
the universe was created approximately 6000 years ago. The Bayes–Laplace rule defines the
posterior, logical probability given data,
P (θ|Tn = n) =
pi0(θ)θ
n∫
pi0(θ)θndθ
=
θn∫
θndθ
= (n + 1)θn,
which is a proper probability for θ; consequently, the probability statements for θ can be estab-
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lished from this posterior. As described in the supplementary materials, given n = 6000×365 =
2, 190, 000 days of consecutive sunrises, the logical probability of E is
P (E|Tn = n) =
∫
θP (θ|Tn = n)dθ =
n+ 1
n+ 2
=
2190001
2190002
= 0.9999995.
The probability of this particular proposition, that is, the sun rising the next day, is eventually
one as the number of observations increases. However, this aspect is not sufficient to confirm the
general proposition G that the sun rises forever. Broad (1918) showed that P (G|Tn = n) = 0
for all n; there is no justification whatsoever for attaching even a moderate probability to a
general proposition if the possible instances of the rule are many times more numerous than
the instances already investigated (See Senn (2003) for a more thorough discussion). Thus,
the Bayes–Laplace rule cannot overcome the degree of skepticism raised by Hume (1748).
Popper (1959, p 383) concluded that the presence of observations cannot alter the zero logical
probability. In Carnap’s inductive logic (1950), the degree of confirmation of every universal
law is always zero. Therefore, the universal law cannot be accepted, but is not rejected until
conflicting evidence appears.
Jeffreys’ resolution
The fact that laws cannot be confirmed via scientific induction based on the Bayes–Laplace
rule means that the choice of the prior had been wrong. Jaynes (2003) argued that a beta prior
density,Beta(α, β) = θα−1(1−θ)β−1/beta(α, β),with beta(·, ·) being the beta function, α > 0
and β > 0, describes the state of knowledge that we have observed α successes and β failures
prior to the experiment. The Bayes–Laplace uniform prior pi0(θ) = 1 is the Beta(1, 1) prior,
which means that the experiment is a true binary one in the sense of physical possibility. This
phenomenon explains why we cannot attain complete confidence of G by using the Bayes–
Laplace rule. The Beta(1, 1) prior means that a trustworthy manufacturer sent you a coin with
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information that he/she observed one head and one tail in two trials before sending the coin.
Even if you have an experiment with heads only for many trials, there is no way to attain
complete confidence on θ = 1, unless you discard the manufacturer’s information. In this case,
Jeffreys’ prior (1939) is Beta(1/2, 1/2), but any prior with α > 0 and β > 0 cannot overcome
the degree of skepticism, i.e., P (G|Tn = n) = 0.
Jeffreys’ (1939) resolution was another prior, which places a mass 1/2 on the general propo-
sition θ = 1 and a uniform prior on [0,1) with 1/2 weight. Then, as described in the supplemen-
tary materials, we have
P (E|Tn = n) =
(n+ 1)(n+ 3)
(n + 2)2
and P (G|Tn = n) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
.
Jeffreys’ resolution produces an important innovation of the Bayes factor for hypothesis testing
(Etz and Wagenmakers, 2017). Senn (2009) considered Jeffreys’ (1939) work as ”a touch of
genius, necessary to rescue the Laplacian formulation of induction”, by allowing P (G|Tn =
n) > 0. According to Jeffrey resolution with a prior P (G) = 1/2,
P (G) = 1/2 < P (G|T1 = 1) = 2/3 < P (G|T2 = 2) = 3/4 < · · · ,
and thus, P (G|Tn = n) increases to one eventually. Using this resolution, a hypothesis cannot
be rejected. However, the scientific induction cannot attain complete confidence even in this era
of big data, because such a process requires infinite evidence.
Confidence resolution
Different priors lead to different logical probabilities. Savage (1954) interpreted these probabil-
ities as subjective probabilities, depending upon personal preferences. It can be controversial
to allow personal preferences in scientific induction. The question is, however, whether we
can form an objective logical probability without presupposing a prior. Newton and Einstein
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may not believe a priori that their laws are true with half of their personal probability. Fisher
(1930) derived, when Tn is continuous, an alternative approach using the P-value which has
been widely used for scientific inferences. As shown in the supplementary materials, we de-
rive a logical probability using Pawitan’s (2003, Chapter 5) right-side P-value P (Tn ≥ t|θ) for
discrete Tn. This P-value leads to a logical probability
P (E|Tn = n) = 1,
so that
P (G|Tn = n) = 1.
According to this confidence resolution,
P (G|T1 = 1) = P (G|T2 = 2 = 1) = · · · = P (G|Tn = n) = 1,
and P (G|Ti 6= i) ≤ P (G|Ti+1 6= i + 1) = 0 for any i ≤ n. This allows the realization of
complete confidence even with a finite n. As shown in the supplementary materials, a prior
can be induced from the logical probability, which can be obtained from the Bayes–Laplace
rule using the induced prior. The right-side P-value P (Tn ≥ t|θ) is an unobservable random
variable because the true value of θ is unknown, and according to Pawitan and Lee (2020) the
Bayes–Laplace rule is also an update rule for the likelihood for unobservable events (Lee et al.,
2017).
In the supplementary materials, we demonstrate that the confidence leads to two potential
induced priors, specifically, Beta(0, 1) and Beta(1, 0). Although these priors are improper,
∫
pi(θ)dθ = ∞, they allow a reasonable interpretation; for example, the Beta(0, 1) prior in-
dicates that only one failure is observed a priori. Thus, if we observe all the failures, it is
legitimate to attain complete confidence on θ = 0. However, even if we observe all the suc-
cesses, we can never attain complete confidence on θ = 1 because of the failure a priori. The
Beta(1, 0) prior exhibits the contrasting property.
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The confidence resolution leads to simultaneous hypothesis testing and estimation of the
confidence density (or probability) function for the confidence intervals. As described in the
supplementary materials, for example, under the induced prior Beta(1, 0), the Bayes–Laplace
rule leads to a posterior (confidence density), for t = 0, 1, · · · , n− 1
P (θ|Tn = t) = θ
t(1− θ)n−t−1/beta(t + 1, n− t).
From this confidence density, we can form a confidence interval for θ, and the actual cover-
age rates in finite sample were reported by Pawitan (2001; Chapter 5). When Tn = n, the
discrete posterior (confidence) P (θ = 1|Tn = n) = 1 is attained. Thus, with Tn = n, the
100% confidence interval for θ is {1}. In the recent developments of the confidence theory, the
confidence density is viewed as an estimate of the true but unknown logical probability, leading
to consistent interval estimation. The coverage probability is a long-run rate of the coverage
of the confidence interval in hypothetical repetitions. Thus, the confidence concept is a bridge
between the Kolmogorov and logical probabilities. We may view the Bayesian posteriors as
estimates of the true logical probability (confidence). In this case, the consistency of the esti-
mations becomes important.
Oracle hypothesis testing and confidence estimation
Our confidence resolution provides an extension of the oracle property of a recent interest for
simultaneous hypothesis testing and point estimation (Fan and Li, 2001). The oracle works as if
it is known in advance whether the general proposition is true or not. We may define the oracle
property as the attainment of complete confidence in finite samples. Thus, P (G|Tn = n) = 1
is an oracle estimator of the true logical probability. To form an oracle procedure, Lee and Oh
(2014) proposed the use of a prior such as Beta(1, 0), which is infinite and not differentiable
at θ = 1. An advantage of using such a prior in the change point problem is that this allows
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a simultaneously consistent estimation of the number of change points and their locations and
sizes (Ng et al., 2018). The induced prior Beta(1, 0) provides simultaneous hypothesis testing
for the two hypotheses H1 : θ = 1 versus H2 : θ 6= 1 and estimation of the logical probability
(confidence). When Tn = n, the confidence resolution ensures that H1 can be accepted with
complete confidence. When Tn 6= n H2 is accepted with complete confidence, and a confidence
interval for θ can be formed using the confidence density. The coverage probability statements
of these intervals are consistent, which maintain the stated level as n increases. Note that
Jeffreys’ resolution cannot accept H1 with complete confidence (see supplementary materials
for detailed discussion).
In response to the skepticism raised by Hume (1748), Kant (1781) proposed the considera-
tion of the general proposition as absolutely valid, a priori, which is otherwise drawn from the
dubious inferential inductions. In contrast Bayes (1763) and Laplace (1814) presumed a priori
that the general proposition is false. Thus, Kant’s proposal is consistent only if the general
proposition is true, whereas the Bayes–Laplace rule is consistent only if the general proposition
is false. It is not necessary a priori to presume P (G) = 0 or 1. The term ”confirmation” has
been used in the epistemology and philosophy of science whenever the observational data (evi-
dence) support scientific theories. Many Bayesian confirmation measures have been proposed.
For example, Carnap’s (1950) degree of confirmation of the general proposition G by the evi-
dence E is C(G,E) = P (G|E) − P (G). Because C(G,E) ≤ 1 − P (G) = P (not G) ≤ 1,
Popper (1959) equated the confirmability with ”refutability”. We see that P (G) = 0 leads to
P (G|Tn = n) = 0 in the sunrise problem.
In Jeffreys’ (1939) resolution with P (G) = 1/2, C(G, Tn = n) = P (G|Tn = n)−P (G) =
n/{2(n + 2)} > 0, and thus the evidence Tn = n confirms the general theory G positively.
However, in the confidence resolution, although the prior P (G) is not defined, complete con-
fidence (confirmation) P (G|Tn = n) = 1 is achieved. Both the resolutions are consistent,
10
regardless of whether G is true or false. However, the former is not an oracle because it cannot
attain complete confidence on the general proposition in a finite sample whereas the latter can.
In this study, the Bayesian prior, Bayes rule, Fisherian P-value, fiducial probability and Neyma-
nian confidence ideas are combined to resolve the induction problem, facilitating the attainment
of complete confidence.
Concluding remarks
Through deduction, one can achieve complete confidence regarding a particular proposition E
P (E|G) = 1,
provided that the general proposition G is true. Through induction, we see that one can attain
complete confidence regarding the general proposition
P (G) ≤ P (G|E)(= P (G|Tn = n)) = 1.
Considering the information provided by the data, we can be certain that the sun rises forever,
provided that the assumed scientific (binomial) model is true. (Of course, in physics, the sun
runs out of energy, and the solar system vanishes eventually.) To establish the universal laws
from the particular instances by means of induction, scientists (or artificial intelligence) do not
need to review all the instances but to establish a scientific model pertaining to the generation of
the instances. To confirm the validity of the general relativity theory, the observational evidence
of light bending was obtained in 1919 and the astrophysical measurement of the gravitational
redshift was obtained in 1925. Thus, a new theory was confirmed based on a few observations.
The oracle confidence resolution shows that such an inductive reasoning is theoretically consis-
tent and therefore rational. More supporting evidence corroborates the consistency of the oracle
estimation of the logical probability. If a long existing scientific theory has not been refuted by
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conflicting evidence, it is theoretically consistent to claim complete confidence regarding the
general propositions derived by the existing scientific theory. The role of the scientific theory
in a scientific induction is the same as that of an axiom in a mathematical deduction. Thus, a
scientific theory can be falsified or confirmed via induction. If one drops an apple, one can be
sure that it will fall unless the Newtonian laws suddenly stops to hold. Indeed, induction can be
the glory of both science and philosophy.
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Supplementary materials
Bayesian approach
Laplace (1814) used the Bernoulli model as an instant of scientific theory for the sunrise prob-
lem. Let X = (X1, · · · , Xn) be independent and identically distributed Bernoulli random
variables with the success probability θ. Once we observed data x = (x1, · · · , xn), we have the
likelihood
L(x, θ) = P (X = x|θ) = θt(1− θ)n−t, (1)
where t =
∑
xi. Prior to knowing of any sunrise, suppose that one is completely ignorant of
the value of θ. Laplace (1814) represented this prior ignorance by means of a uniform prior
pi0(θ) = 1 on θ ∈ [0, 1]. Let Tn =
∑
Xi. To find the logical conditional probability of θ given
Tn = n, one uses the Bayes-Laplace rule: The conditional probability distribution of θ given
the data x is called the posterior
P (θ|x) =
pi0(θ)L(x, θ)∫
L(x, θ)pi0(θ)dθ
=
pi0(θ)L(x, θ)
P (x)
, (2)
where
P (x) =
∫
L(x, θ)pi0(θ)dθ =
∫
θt(1− θ)n−tdθ = b(t+ 1, n− t+ 1),
where b(·, ·) is the beta function. Let E be a particular proposition that the sun rises tomorrow.
Then,
P (Tn = n) = b(n+ 1, 1) = 1/(n+ 1),
to give
P (E| It has risen n consecutive days)
= P (Xn+1 = 1|Tn = n) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
=
2190001
2190002
= 0.9999995.
This shows that
P (E|Tn = n)→ 1 as n→∞.
One observation increases the probability of the particular proposition from n/(n + 1) to (n +
1)/(n+2), so that the increment of probability is (n+1)/(n+2)−n/(n+1) = 1/{(n+1)(n+
1
2)}. Thus, the probability of this particular proposition will be eventually one. However, this is
not enough to ensure the general proposition G that the sun rises forever holds (Senn, 2003).
The probability that the sun rises in the next m consecutive days, given the previous n
consecutive sunrises, is
P (Xn+1 = 1, ..., Xn+m = 1|Tn = n) = P (Tn+m = n+m|Tn = n) =
n+ 1
n+m+ 1
.
As long as n is finite, the probability of the general propositionG becomes zero because for all
n > 0
P (G|Tn = n) = lim
m→∞
P (Tn+m = n +m|Tn = n) = 0.
Consider Jeffreys’s prior, which places 1/2 of probability on θ = 1 and puts a uniform prior on
[0,1) with 1/2 probability. Then,
P (Tn = n) = 0.5{1 + 1/(n+ 1)}
to give
P (E|Tn = n) = P (Tn+1 = n+ 1|Tn = n) =
1 + 1/(n+ 2)
1 + 1/(n+ 1)
=
(n+ 1)(n+ 2)
(n+ 2)2
,
P (Tn+m = n +m|Tn = n) =
1 + 1/(n+m+ 1)
1 + 1/(n+ 1)
=
(n + 1)(n+m+ 2)
(n + 2)(n+m+ 1)
.
Thus,
P (G|Tn = n) =
n+ 1
n+ 2
.
Confidence approach
Let T be a continuous sufficient statistics for parameter θ. Let t be an observed value of T.
Define the right-side P-value function
C(t, θ) = P (T ≥ t|θ).
Given t, as a function of θ, C(t,−∞) = 0 and C(t,∞) = 1 and C(t, θ) is a strictly increasing
function of θ. Thus, C(t, θ) behaves as if it is the cumulative distribution of θ. This leads to the
confidence density for θ, analogous to the Bayesian posterior
P (θ|t) = dC(t, θ)/dθ,
which is the fiducial probability of Fisher (1930), not using a subjective prior. Schweder and
Hjort (2016) called it the confidence density.
Fisher considered cases for T to be continuous. However, in practical applications T does
not have to be continuous. In the Bernoulli model, Tn is a sufficient statistics but is discrete. The
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so-called ‘exact inference’ from discrete data can be expressed in terms of confidence density.
Consider the conservative right-side P-value
C(t, θ) = P (Tn ≥ t|θ) =
n∑
y=t
n!
y!(n− y)!
θy(1− θ)n−y =
∫ θ
0
xt−1(1− x)n−tdx
b(t, n− t+ 1)
.
This leads to the confidence density
P (θ|t) = θt−1(1− θ)n−t/b(t, n− t + 1),
which gives a conservative confidence interval (Pawitan, 2001; Chapter 5). See Pawitan and
Lee (2020) for a more thorough discussion.
Because the confidence density is analogous to the posterior, the induced model prior is
c0(θ) ∝ P (θ|t)/L(θ) = θ
−1,
which is objective because it is directly obtained solely from the model. However, the model
prior c0(θ) ∝ θ
−1, namely the Beta(0, 1) distribution, is improper to give
∫
1
0
c0(θ)dθ = ∞.
Necessary computations of Beta(0, 1) can be obtained as the limit of proper Beta(a, 1) distri-
bution for a > 0. The confidence density can be viewed as the posterior (2) but replacing the
confidence prior c0(θ) by the Bayesian prior pi0(θ).
This leads to
P (Tn = n) =
∫
θn−1dθ = 1/n
to give
P (Xn+1 = 1|Tn = n) =
P (Tn+1 = n+ 1)
P (Tn = n)
=
n
n+ 1
,
P (Tn+m = n+m|Tn = n) =
P (Tn+m = n+m)
P (Tn = n)
=
n
n +m
.
Given n, P (G|Tn = n) = limm→∞ P (Tn+m = n + m|Tn = n) = 0. Thus, this confidence
density cannot overcome the degree of scepticism yet.
Now apply the confidence to the transformed data, by defining Yi = 0 if the sun rises in the
ith day, where P (Yi = 1) = θ
∗ = 1 − θ and θ is the long-run frequency of sunrises. Thus,
θ∗ = 1 is equivalent to θ = 0. Then, Yi = 1−Xi. Let T
∗
n =
∑
Yi = n− Tn. Then,
P (Yn+1 = 0|T
∗
n = 0) = P (Xn+1 = 1|Tn = n) = lim
a↓0
b(a, n+ 2)
b(a, n+ 1)
= 1,
to give
P (G|T ∗n = 0) = P (G|Tn = n) = lim
m→∞
P (T ∗n+m = 0|T
∗
n = 0) = 1.
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Because P (G|Tn = n) = 1, under the transformed data, we can say that the sun will always
rise with the logical probability being one. It is a little disturbing that the confidence statement
depends upon the scale of the data Xi and Yi = 1 − Xi to which the confidence procedure is
applied. Now we see the consequences and show that the resulting confidence procedures are
consistent.
Because the confidence interval for θ∗ is easily transformed to that of θ,we can readily apply
the confidence to the transformed data. This leads to the confidence density and the Beta(1, 0)
model prior
P (θ|t) = P (θ∗|n− t) ∝ θt(1− θ)n−t−1 and c0(θ) ∝ P (θ|t)/L(θ) = (1− θ)
−1.
This model prior leads to
P (Xn+1 = 1|Tn = n) = lim
a↓0
b(n + 2, a)
b(n + 1, a)
= 1,
to give
P (G|Tn = n) = lim
m→∞
P (Tn+m = n +m|Tn = n) = 1.
We can interpret a Beta(α, β) prior with α > 0 and β > 0 as describing the state of
knowledge that a priori we have observed α successes and β failures. Then,
P (Xn+1 = 1|Tn = n) =
Beta(n + 1 + α, β)
Beta(n + α, β)
=
n+ α
n+ α + β
and
P (Xn+1 = 0|Tn = 0) =
Beta(α, n + 1 + β)
Beta(α, n+ β)
=
n+ β
n + α + β
.
Thus, P (Xn+1 = 1|Tn = n) → 1 as β → 0 and P (Xn+1 = 0|Tn = 0) → 1 as α → 0. Jaynes
(2003) argued that the Bayes-Laplace Beta(1, 1) prior is the state of knowledge in which we
have observed one success and one failure a priori the experiment. Thus, we know that the
experiment is a true binary one, in the sense of physical possibility. This explains why we
cannot reach a sure confidence of the general proposition with the Bayes-Laplace uniform prior
because one day of no sunrise is assumed a priori. Thus, it cannot be an ignorant prior. Suppose
that you were sent a coin from a manufacturer who informed you that before sending the coin
an experiment was done and found one head and one tail in two trials. Even if you have done
an experiment with heads only for many trials, there is no way to have the sure confidence on
θ = 1 if you accepts the manufacturer’s information.
The model priors Beta(0,1) and Beta(1,0) allow a possibility that θ = 0 and θ = 1, respec-
tively. The Haldane (1932) prior, namely the Beta(0, 0)∝ θ−1(1 − θ)−1, means that no success
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and no failure has been observed a priori, so that it presumes that either θ = 1 or θ = 0 is
possible. Under Haldane’s prior
P (Xn+1 = 1|Tn = n) = 1 and P (Xn+1 = 0|Tn = 0) = 1
to give
P (G|Tn = n) = 1.
If you were not given any information from the manufacturer, it is natural to have the sure
confidence on θ = 1, provided you have not observed a single tail in your own experiment.
Note here that with the right-side P-value, for any θ ∈ [0, 1]
C(0, θ) = P (Tn ≥ 0|θ) = 1.
This means that θ has a point mass at zero given t = 0, leading to the 100 % confidence
interval for θ, given t = 0, is {0}. With the transformed data, we can show that it has the point
mass at θ = 1 given t = n, leading to the 100 % confidence interval for θ, given t = n, is
{1}. The general proposition such as θ = 0 or 1 is scientific because it can be falsified if a
conflicting observation appears. Sure confidence for the general proposition such as θ = 1 or 0
is consequence of the scientific procedure, the P-value.
Oracle hypothesis testing and confidence estimation
The induced priorBeta(1, 0) gives indeed simultaneous hypothesis testing for the two hypothe-
ses H1 : θ = 1 versus H2 : θ 6= 1 and estimation of the logical probability (confidence). When
Tn = n, the confidence resolution allows thatH1 can be accepted with a sure confidence. When
Tn 6= n H2 is accepted with a sure confidence and using the confidence density a confidence
interval for θ can be formed. Coverage probability statements of these intervals are consistent,
which maintain the stated level as n increases. Thus, when θ = 1, we can say it is true with
the sure confidence provided Tn = n. When θ 6= 1, Tn cannot be n if n is sufficiently large,
so that we cannot achieve the sure confidence on θ = 1 with a large n. It is therefore consis-
tent whether θ = 1 or not. With the Haldane (1932) prior, Beta(0, 0), the resulting procedure
gives a simultaneous hypothesis testing and confidence estimation: When Tn = n (Tn = 0),
H1 : θ = 1 (H2 : θ = 0) is accepted with 100 % confidence interval {1} ({0}), and when
1 ≤ Tn ≤ n − 1 the hypothesis H3 : θ ∈ (0, 1) is accepted with an estimator of the logical
probability (confidence density)
P (θ|Tn = t) = θ
t−1(1− θ)n−t−1/beta(t, n− t),
which gives a consistent confidence interval. Schweder and Hjort, (2016) proposed the use
of mid-point P-value, which, even though unreported, leads to confidence density based on
Jeffreys’s (1939) Beta(1/2,1/2) prior. The resulting procedure is therefore not oracle.
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